자유와 결정론의 대립을 넘어: 칸트와 셸링의 ‘근본악’ 개념을 중심으로

Abstract

Antagonization of determinism and human freedom is a widespread, commonly accepted view point in the history of philosophy and theology. In theological discourse the antagonization of determinism and human freedom was dealt with in the context of emphasizing the sovereign freedom of God over the creature; and in philosophical discussion, the accentuation of human freedom in modern European philosophy leads to the new form of antagonization, namely the opposition of human spirit against the causal determined natural law. However, these ways of thinking give rise to contradictory result which is discordant to the main motive of the antagonization: Based on the opposition of freedom of God and human destiny through Divine determination, and based on the opposition of human freedom and natural determination, neither the Divine freedom nor the human freedom can be conceived, as the contemporary philosophical dispute on the human freedom and determinism shows. Regarding to the theological and the philosophical argumentation depicted, this article aims to solve the problem of opposition of freedom and determinism by concentrating on the concept of ‘the radical evil’ which helps understand the philosophy of freedom Kant’s and Schelling’s. By comparing the function of the concept in each philosophical system of two great German thinkers, it will be pursued to find possibility for harmonizing Divine freedom and human freedom, human freedom and causally operating nature. As a result, an alternative idea of human freedom deduced from Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift will be suggested. The ‘Bestimmtheit’ of human freedom, that is, Divine agency and natural operation which is based on the Divine freedom and Divine love are constitutive elements of human freedom.