CEO Duality and Firm Performance: Does Economic Policy Uncertainty Mediate the Relation?
- Authors
- Chang, Kiyoung; Lee, Junyoup; Shim, Hyeongsop
- Issue Date
- Dec-2019
- Publisher
- WILEY
- Citation
- INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, v.19, no.4, pp.877 - 891
- Journal Title
- INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE
- Volume
- 19
- Number
- 4
- Start Page
- 877
- End Page
- 891
- URI
- https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/gachon/handle/2020.sw.gachon/17896
- DOI
- 10.1111/irfi.12193
- ISSN
- 1369-412X
- Abstract
- Exploiting two exogenous shocks, we examine the relation between CEO-Chairman duality and firm performance. We report evidence that CEO duality benefits a firm when economic policy uncertainty is high. This implies that CEO--Chairman duality is an advantageous governance mechanism for coping with economic policy uncertainty. We show that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reduced firm performance if a firm had separate leadership in 2001. However, this negative effect was mitigated if a firm had combined leadership in 2001. The results suggest that CEO duality is complementary to board independence and that the value of CEO duality is contingent on a firm's environment.
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