The changing dynamics of state-business relations and the politics of reform and capture in South Korea
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | You, Jong-sung | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-04-06T07:39:15Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2020-04-02 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021-01 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0969-2290 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/gachon/handle/2020.sw.gachon/26461 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The Choi Soon-sil scandal, which led to the arrest of the de facto leader of Samsung Group Lee Jae-yong and the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, exposed the ugly features of state capture in South Korea. Although the 1997-1998 financial crisis highlighted the problems of crony capitalism, it has been widely recognized that South Korea overcame the crisis by implementing far-reaching reforms of the chaebol's corporate governance. This article explores why the post-crisis reform failed to end the practices of crony capitalism and why global companies like Samsung engaged in such corruption through a historical case study of Samsung Group. It highlights how increasing inequality and chaebol concentration have produced both popular pressures for institutional reform and incentives for chaebol to capture the policy-making process in the context of the changing state-business-civil society relations in the democratic post-developmental state era. I find that while the main objective of the chaebol's bribery and lobbying of the government before the financial crisis was business expansion through the acquisition of low-interest loans and other government favors, it has changed to weakening or circumventing government regulations on corporate governance in order to achieve easier and cheaper dynastic successions of corporate control. | - |
dc.language | 영어 | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY | - |
dc.title | The changing dynamics of state-business relations and the politics of reform and capture in South Korea | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000519166800001 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/09692290.2020.1724176 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, v.28, no.1, pp.81 - 102 | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85077047336 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 102 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 81 | - |
dc.citation.title | REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY | - |
dc.citation.volume | 28 | - |
dc.citation.number | 1 | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | You, Jong-sung | - |
dc.type.docType | Article; Early Access | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Chaebol | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Samsung | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | capture | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | inequality | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | corporate governance | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | state-business relations | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | developmental state | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | South Korea | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | DEVELOPMENTAL STATE | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Business & Economics | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | International Relations | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Government & Law | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Economics | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | International Relations | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Political Science | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | ssci | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
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