A Novel Joint Dataset and Incentive Management Mechanism for Federated Learning Over MEC

Abstract

In this study, to reduce the energy consumption for the federated learning (FL) participation of mobile devices (MDs), we design a novel joint dataset and incentive management mechanism for FL over mobile edge computing (MEC) systems. We formulate a Stackelberg game to model and analyze the behaviors of FL participants, referred to as MDs, and FL service providers, referred to as MECs. In the proposed game, each MEC is the leader, whereas the MDs are followers. As the leader, to maximize its own revenue by considering the trade-off between the cost of providing incentives and the estimated accuracy attained from an FL operation, each MEC provides full incentives to the MDs for the participation of each FL task, as well as the target accuracy level for each MD. The suggested total incentives are allocated over MDs' proportion to the amount of dataset applied for local training, which indirectly affects the global accuracy of the FL. Based on the suggested incentives, the MDs determine the amount of dataset used for the local training of each FL task to maximize their own payoffs, which is defined as the energy consumed from FL participation and the expected incentives. We study the economic benefits of the joint dataset and incentive management mechanism by analyzing its hierarchical decision-making scheme as a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game. Using backward induction, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium among MDs, and then examine the Stackelberg equilibrium by analyzing the leader game. We also discuss extensions of the proposed mechanism where the MDs are unaware of explicit information of other MD profiles, such as the weights of the revenue as a practical concern, which can be redesigned into the Stackelberg Bayesian game. Finally, we reveal that the Stackelberg equilibrium solution maximizes the utility of all MDs and the MECs.