The Influence of Ownership Concentration on Sustainable Merger and Acquisition Performance: Navigating Principal Conflicts in the Korean Market

Abstract

This study examines the dynamics of owner behavior, agency costs, and M&A outcomes in the Korean market, aiming to explore how ownership concentration influences conflicts among principal groups and impacts M&A performance. Using empirical data from Korean M&A transactions, we analyze the effects of ownership concentration and cash payment preferences on firm value. Our findings indicate that while ownership concentration can reduce owner-manager conflicts, it heightens principal-principal conflicts, especially with moderate ownership, weak governance, or financial distress. Control-focused owners prefer cash payments, which can lower acquiring firm announcement returns under high ownership concentrations. Effective governance is crucial for fostering responsible decision-making and sustainable practices in M&As. This research underscores the importance of balanced ownership structures and robust governance mechanisms in mitigating agency conflicts and promoting sustainable M&A performance.