Are Some Beliefs Essentially Indexical?

Abstract

This article seeks to clarify and resolve a philosophical debate that has arisen around the claim that certain beliefs are essentially indexical. While Perry (1979) provided the first and perhaps most influential argument in support of this claim, Perry’s classic argument has more recently come under fire; in particular, Cappelen and Dever (2013) maintain that Perry’s argument reveals nothing more than the uncontroversial fact that action explanations are referentially opaque. However, Babb (2016) attempts to vindicate Perry’s claim that certain beliefs are essentially indexical by means of a new argument based on the hypothesis that intentions are essentially indexical. According to Babb (2016), it is because of the indexicality of intentions that certain beliefs are also essentially indexical. In this article I attempt to show that Babb (2016) fails to save the claim that certain beliefs are essentially indexical. I do so by arguing for two points: (a) that the hypothesis that intentions are essentially indexical is poorly supported and most likely false; and (b) that even if intentions were essentially indexical it would not follow that certain beliefs are also essentially indexical. The conclusion of this article is that neither Perry (1979) nor Babb (2016) succeeds in defending the idea that certain beliefs are essentially indexical.