Can one decide to do something without forming an intention to do it?
- Authors
- Mcguire, John
- Issue Date
- Jul-2016
- Publisher
- OXFORD UNIV PRESS
- Keywords
- experimental philosophy; intentions; Michael Bratman; practical decisions; side-effect actions
- Citation
- ANALYSIS, v.76, no.3, pp.269 - 278
- Indexed
- SCIE
AHCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- ANALYSIS
- Volume
- 76
- Number
- 3
- Start Page
- 269
- End Page
- 278
- URI
- https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/hanyang/handle/2021.sw.hanyang/154320
- DOI
- 10.1093/analys/anw036
- ISSN
- 0003-2638
- Abstract
- According to the received view of practical decisions, ‘deciding to X’ is synonymous with ‘forming an intention to X’. In this article, I argue against the received view on the basis of both experimental evidence and theoretical considerations. The evidence concerns a case involving a side-effect action in which people tend to agree that an agent decided to X yet disagree that the agent had a corresponding intention to X. Additionally, I explain why one should expect decisions and intentions to diverge in the case of certain side-effect actions.
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