New evidence on what happens to CEOs after they retire
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Lee, Chang min | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-07-16T20:06:31Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-07-16T20:06:31Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-05-13 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011-06 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0929-1199 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/hanyang/handle/2021.sw.hanyang/168169 | - |
dc.description.abstract | I analyze directorships held by CEOs who retired during the periods 1989-1993,1995-1999 (before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and 2001-2005 (after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). My results suggest that retired CEOs became less popular on boards after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In addition, although pre-retirement accounting performance helps explain the number of outside directorships a retired CEO held in the 1989-1993 sample, as Brickley et al. (1999) have found, it does not explain this number for the 1995-1999 sample and 2001-2005 sample. Third, a company's stock performance during a CEO's tenure is negatively related to the number of outside directorships only in the 2001-2005 sample. Fourth, the number of outside directorships is positively correlated with the size of a retired CEO's original firm before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but this is not the case after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Finally, if retired CEOs worked in regulated industries, their probability of serving at least one outside directorship 2 years after retirement falls by 21% in the 1989-1993 sample. However, this negative effect is marginally significant in the 1995-1999 sample, and vanishes in the 2001-2005 sample | - |
dc.language | 영어 | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Elsevier BV | - |
dc.title | New evidence on what happens to CEOs after they retire | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Lee, Chang min | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.01.004 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-79952707102 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000290882300006 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | Journal of Corporate Finance, v.17, no.3, pp.474 - 482 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | Journal of Corporate Finance | - |
dc.citation.title | Journal of Corporate Finance | - |
dc.citation.volume | 17 | - |
dc.citation.number | 3 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 474 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 482 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | 정기학술지(Article(Perspective Article포함)) | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | ssci | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Business & Economics | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Business, Finance | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | SARBANES-OXLEY ACTDETERMINANTSOWNERSHIPDIRECTORSIMPACT | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Corporate governanceBoards of directorsSarbanes-Oxley ActDeregulationProfessional labor marketAccounting performance | - |
dc.identifier.url | https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119911000083 | - |
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