비협조 동적게임이론을 이용한 경쟁적 전력시장의 발전기 보수계획 전략분석
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 김진호 | - |
dc.contributor.author | 박종배 | - |
dc.contributor.author | 김발호 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-03-14T07:45:12Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-03-14T07:45:12Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2022-03-14 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1229-2443 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/hongik/handle/2020.sw.hongik/26070 | - |
dc.description.abstract | - In this paper, a novel approach to generator maintenance scheduling strategy in competitive electricity markets based on non-cooperative dynamic game theory is presented. The main contribution of this study can be considered to develop a game-theoretic framework for analyzing strategic behaviors of generating companies (Gencos) from the standpoints of the generator maintenance-scheduling problem (GMP) game. To obtain the equilibrium solution for the GMP game, the GMP problem is formulated as a dynamic non-cooperative game with complete information. In the proposed game, the players correspond to the profit-maximizing individual Gencos, and the payoff of each player is defined as the profits from the energy market. The optimal maintenance schedule is defined by subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Numerical results for two-Genco system by both proposed method and conventional one are used to demonstrate that 1) the proposed framework can be successfully applied in analyzing the strategic behaviors of each Genco in changed markets and 2) both methods show considerably different results in terms of market stability or system reliability. The result indicates that generator maintenance scheduling strategy is one of the crucial strategic decision-makings whereby Gencos can maximize their profits in a competitive market environment. | - |
dc.publisher | 대한전기학회 | - |
dc.title | 비협조 동적게임이론을 이용한 경쟁적 전력시장의 발전기 보수계획 전략분석 | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | 김발호 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | 전기학회논문지 A권, v.52, no.9, pp.542 - 549 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | 전기학회논문지 A권 | - |
dc.citation.title | 전기학회논문지 A권 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 52 | - |
dc.citation.number | 9 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 542 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 549 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.identifier.kciid | ART001002756 | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 2 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | kci | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Competitive markets | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Generator maintenance scheduling | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Subgame perfect equilibrium | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Non-cooperative dynamic game. | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Competitive markets | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Generator maintenance scheduling | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Subgame perfect equilibrium | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Non-cooperative dynamic game. | - |
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