A continuous strategy game for power transactions analysis in competitive electricity markets
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Park, JB | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kim, BH | - |
dc.contributor.author | Kim, JH | - |
dc.contributor.author | Jung, MH | - |
dc.contributor.author | Park, JK | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-04-12T06:41:02Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-04-12T06:41:02Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2022-04-12 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2001-11 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0885-8950 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/hongik/handle/2020.sw.hongik/27176 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper presents a game theory application for analyzing power transactions in a deregulated energy marketplace such as PoolCo, where participants, especially, generating entities, maximize their net profits through optimal bidding strategies (i.e., bidding prices and bidding generations). In this paper, the electricity market for power transactions is modeled as a noncooperative game with complete information, where the solution is determined in a continuous strategy domain having recourse to the Nash equilibrium idea. In order to provide more apprehensible analysis, we suggest a new hybrid solution approach employing a 2-dimensional graphical approach as well as an analytical method. Finally, the proposed approach is demonstrated on a sample power system. | - |
dc.language | 영어 | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC | - |
dc.subject | SYSTEMS | - |
dc.title | A continuous strategy game for power transactions analysis in competitive electricity markets | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Kim, BH | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/59.962436 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000171787000038 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, v.16, no.4, pp.847 - 855 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS | - |
dc.citation.title | IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS | - |
dc.citation.volume | 16 | - |
dc.citation.number | 4 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 847 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 855 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scie | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Engineering | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Engineering, Electrical & Electronic | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | SYSTEMS | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | continuous strategy | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | deregulation | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | game theory | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | PoolCo model | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | spot market | - |
Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
94, Wausan-ro, Mapo-gu, Seoul, 04066, Korea02-320-1314
COPYRIGHT 2020 HONGIK UNIVERSITY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
Certain data included herein are derived from the © Web of Science of Clarivate Analytics. All rights reserved.
You may not copy or re-distribute this material in whole or in part without the prior written consent of Clarivate Analytics.