영국의저작인격권에 관한 소고

Abstract

Moral rights are traditionally thought to have stemmed from the personhood theory originating from the philosophies of Kant and Hegel. Indeed, moral rights are considered to be the single biggest difference between the copyright regimes of common law countries and civil law countries. Korea as a civil law country has had from the very beginning of its copyright law history a strong set of moral rights protecting the author. However, what is becoming more evident is the potential for conflict between the existing moral rights regime under the Korean copyright law and the more recently transplanted features of what could be characterised as common law copyright legal provisions. These include a new set of rules for dealing with the ownership of copyright in works made for hire that are stipulated to belong to the employer and not the employee, and the introduction of a fair use exception a la United States copyright law. This problem does not arise to the same extent because of the very limited way in which moral rights are protected in the US. England, however, has enacted a broader moral rights regime and at the same time have limited their application according to subject matter and the type of work. The English model has been widely adopted in many other common law countries including Australia and New Zealand. This article examines the history and the current regime of moral rights in the United Kingdom and engages in a brief comparative analysis of the respective moral rights regime in the United Kingdom and Korea in order to glean ways in which the potential for conflict between the civil law traditions of the existing Korean moral rights regime may be resolved with the common law provisions recently adopted by Korean copyright law.