인터넷전문은행의 진입과 은행 경쟁의 경제적 분석 연구

Abstract

In this study, we developed a comprehensive economic model to analyze impacts by Internet Bank’s entry. In the proposed model, one offline bank and one Internet Bank compete in interest rate spreads to capture customers in market structure of a duopoly market. Two groups of customers have their own preferred bank and thus bear switching costs when they switch to the other one less preferred. With undercut-proof equilibrium, we characterize equilibrium interest rate spreads, bank’ profit, customer’s surplus and social welfare. And we also conduct comparative static analysis on under-cut proof equilibrium when parameters change due to bank’s strategic response and customer’s behavioral adjustment. The results are as follows. First, network reduction by offline bank results in customer surplus and social welfare but decreases Internet bank profit. Second, more mobile banking and call-center reduces customer switching costs and offline network dependency, resulting in higher customer surplus and social welfare and lower profits. Third, a higher level of bank security costs Internet bank more, leading to suboptimal security protection. Fourth, interest rate spreads gets bigger since Internet bank has less incentive of providing beneficial spread to induce customers from offline bank when more customers prefer Internet bank.