A Privacy-Preserving Key Management Scheme with Support for Sybil Attack Detection in VANETs

Abstract

Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) face two important and conflicting challenges with regards to security: preserve the privacy of vehicles in order to prevent malicious entities from tracking users and detect and remove bad actors that attempt to game the system for their own advantage. In particular, detecting Sybil attacks, in which one node attempts to appear as many, seemingly conflicts with the goal of privacy preservation, and existing schemes fail on either one or both accounts. To fill this gap, we present a hierarchical key management system which uses short group signatures to preserve member privacy at lower levels while allowing mid-level nodes to detect Sybil attacks and highly trusted nodes at the top of the hierarchy to completely reveal the real identities of malicious nodes in order to prevent them from rejoining the system and for use by legal authorities. In addition, we present an argument for relaxing the requirement of backward secrecy in VANET groups in the case when no malicious activity has been detected.