The role of government in the redistribution of property rights: The case of the korean greenbelt

Abstract

This study addresses Korean Greenbelt revision. This revision may be labeled a puzzle based on the fact that although the Greenbelt had been considered to be one of the most impregnable institutions in Korea it is now faced with a complete reformulation following the previous government reform initiation six years ago. In order to solve the puzzle, this study adopts an approach that focuses the role of the government in the redistribution of property rights. To do so, this study first describes in detailed fashion the process of the Greenbelt revision from 1997 up to the present. Secondly, this study delineates three models on the role of government in the redistribution of property rights: the naive model, the interest group model, and the strong state model. Thirdly, this study attempts to empirically assess the most adequate model to explain the role of the government in the revision of the Korean Greenbelt. Finally, this study draws policy implications using both theoretical and empirical analyses. The major policy recommendation drawn from the analyses is that, as the major impetus behind the revision of the Korean Greenbelt appears to be the realization of the private interests of the ruler at the costs of the general public, a mechanism should be strengthened to restrain the exercise of power by the ruler of the government with regards to the redistribution of property rights. © 2004 International Review of Public Administration.