Spinoza on Identity and Parallelism스피노자의 평행론과 동일성
- Other Titles
- 스피노자의 평행론과 동일성
- Authors
- 박삼열
- Issue Date
- Feb-2021
- Publisher
- 한국문화융합학회
- Keywords
- 스피노자; 델라 로카; 정신과 신체; 동일성; 평행론; Spinoza; Della Rocca; Mind-Body; Identity; Parallelism
- Citation
- 문화와 융합, v.43, no.2, pp.867 - 883
- Journal Title
- 문화와 융합
- Volume
- 43
- Number
- 2
- Start Page
- 867
- End Page
- 883
- URI
- http://scholarworks.bwise.kr/ssu/handle/2018.sw.ssu/40592
- ISSN
- 1225-0422
- Abstract
- This paper focuses on the problems in the parallelist interpretation by appealing to the identity of the mind and the body. Della Rocca has claimed that Spinoza’s denial of the transparency of a causal context provides support for the identity interpretation of Spinoza’s mind-body theory. On the basis of this argument, Della Rocca attempts to find this identity in the concept of a neutral property based on Spinoza’s argument for parallelism. Della Rocca tries to explain how, given identity, we can keep the attributes as distinct as Spinoza claims. I considered whether Della Rocca’s concept of neutral property is compatible with Spinoza’s doctrine of identity between the mind and the body.
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