유통산업에서의 경쟁법적인 쟁점과 규제방안에 관한 연구

Abstract

The unfair relationships between large-scaled distributors and suppliers or store lessees has become one of the emerging antitrust issues in Korean society. Large-scaled distributors have the power to obtain a concession from another party by threatening to impose a cost, or withdraw a benefit, if the party does not grant the concession. However, antitrust law has some difficulties in dealing with them effectively. Antitrust grew up in an age characterized by merging manufacturers and horizontal cartels, so the concept of monopoly or monopsony played an important role in the regulation of them. Of course, large-scaled distributors can have buyer power if they have large market share or monopsony power. According to U.K. Competition Commission, retail buyer power can be very significant even if the market share of a retailer is as little as 8 percent of the total market. However, Professor Dobson asserts that there are three other primary sources of buyer. They may be found in their roles as (a) customers, (b) competitors, and (c) suppliers for producers. In environment like this, an individual supplier tends to be far more reliant for its profitability on trading with an individual large-scaled distributor than vice-versa. This article examines the sources of buyer power that large-scaled distributors have and attempts to find how to regulate them effectively and realize the mutually complementary development of the large-scaled distributor, supplier and store lessee on an equal status.

The unfair relationships between large-scaled distributors and suppliers or store lessees has become one of the emerging antitrust issues in Korean society. Large-scaled distributors have the power to obtain a concession from another party by threatening to impose a cost, or withdraw a benefit, if the party does not grant the concession. However, antitrust law has some difficulties in dealing with them effectively. Antitrust grew up in an age characterized by merging manufacturers and horizontal cartels, so the concept of monopoly or monopsony played an important role in the regulation of them. Of course, large-scaled distributors can have buyer power if they have large market share or monopsony power. According to U.K. Competition Commission, retail buyer power can be very significant even if the market share of a retailer is as little as 8 percent of the total market. However, Professor Dobson asserts that there are three other primary sources of buyer. They may be found in their roles as (a) customers, (b) competitors, and (c) suppliers for producers. In environment like this, an individual supplier tends to be far more reliant for its profitability on trading with an individual large-scaled distributor than vice-versa. This article examines the sources of buyer power that large-scaled distributors have and attempts to find how to regulate them effectively and realize the mutually complementary development of the large-scaled distributor, supplier and store lessee on an equal status.