고위험운전자와 음주운전자는 보험을 더 많이 가입할까? : 한국자동차보험시장의 역선택과 도덕적위태에 대한 실증

Abstract

This study analyzes adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the Korean auto insurance market, where regulation is tight, policy forms are standardized, and all insurers share policyholders’ experiences. Our dataset considers risk heterogeneity: standard drivers; drunk-drivers; high-risk drivers. In addition, we merged the data with the ‘long-term driver insurance’ information they purchased. Using a general regression and logistic regression we verify a weak adverse-selection problem under the current auto insurance scheme, while adverse-selection problem exists prudently where no underwriting is required. Our results show that an insured who caused auto accident is prone to purchase additional insurance products and vice-versa. In this market, we have both ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard problems, too. Thus we need to revise deductible system and introduce underwriting factors to the long-term drivers insurance to curb these moral hazards problems and to protect bona fide customers.