Detailed Information

Cited 0 time in webofscience Cited 0 time in scopus
Metadata Downloads

The effect of bank governance on borrowers' accounting choices

Authors
Hur, Kang SungHwang, In Tae
Issue Date
Nov-2023
Publisher
ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
Keywords
Appointment structure; bank governance; earnings management; borrower; discretionary accruals
Citation
ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, v.30, no.6, pp 1417 - 1443
Pages
27
Journal Title
ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
Volume
30
Number
6
Start Page
1417
End Page
1443
URI
https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/cau/handle/2019.sw.cau/48107
DOI
10.1080/16081625.2021.1872032
ISSN
1608-1625
2164-2257
Abstract
This study analyzes the effect of bank CEO appointment structure and tenure on borrowers' accounting practices and earnings management. Drawing on agency theory, we posit that agency costs are high for banks that frequently change CEOs and those that appoint CEOs from external sources. The results indicate firms that borrow from banks with high agency costs adopt less conservative accounting practices and employ real activities earnings management when deteriorating management conditions lead to negative cash flow. This study provides a strong empirical foundation for future research by verifying that appointment structure and tenure of bank CEOs affect borrowers' accounting choices.
Files in This Item
There are no files associated with this item.
Appears in
Collections
College of Business & Economics > School of Business Administration > 1. Journal Articles

qrcode

Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Altmetrics

Total Views & Downloads

BROWSE