Long-term performance following share repurchase, signaling costs and accounting transparency: Korean evidence

Abstract

Purpose Existing studies show that firms may have an incentive to use share repurchases opportunistically, thereby taking advantage of market participants' confirmation bias that share repurchase is a signal of undervaluation. This study aims to investigate whether signaling costs and accounting transparency can serve as tools to identify opportunistic share repurchases. Design/methodology/approach The authors measure signaling costs by using two share repurchase methods (direct and indirect share repurchase) with different share repurchase costs, and measure accounting transparency using the history of earnings timeliness. The authors further measure long-term performance following share repurchases using operating performance and stock returns. Lastly, the authors compare the long-term performances between the groups defined by share repurchase method and earnings timeliness level. Findings The authors find that indirect share repurchase firms with a history of poor earnings timeliness experience unfavorable long-term performance, while other share repurchase firms do not. This finding reinforces the view that some share repurchases may be driven by managerial opportunism. In particular, when firms with a history of poor earnings-reporting behavior choose a low-cost repurchase method, their share repurchases may be motivated by managerial opportunism. Originality/value The findings suggest that past earnings timeliness and the signaling costs of a repurchase together are useful predictors of false signaling. Moreover, they suggest that investors can - at least in part - predict opportunistic share repurchases by using signaling costs and accounting transparency.