China's Great Power Identity and Its Policy on the Korean Peninsula in the Xi Jinping Era

Abstract

This study analyzes the reflection of the “great power identity” of China during the Xi Jinping administration in its policy on the Korean Peninsula. The Xi leadership has emphasized the “core interests” of China founded on the great power identity, and has projected more assertive peripheral diplomacy to expand its influence in East Asia. China will not dare to challenge the US dominant international order, but will seek to receive treatments relative to “the rise of China.” On the basis of this recognition, the Chinese leadership regards the Korean Peninsula not simply as a security environment in which the status quo should be maintained, but as a venue on which it wields its expanding leverage. That is, China, as a rising great power, has no choice but to stress its relationship with both South and North Korea to prepare for the strategic competition with the dominating power, the United States, and undermine US regional influence in East Asia. Because of this point, China has shown inconsistent behaviors in its Korean Peninsula policy: It not only strongly denounces the nuclearization of North Korea, but also opposes economic sanctions that could inflict severe damage on the North Korean regime. While China values South Korea's strategic values, it is taking a firm stand on foreign and security issues such as the THAAD deployment. Based on its great power identity, China recognizes the Korean Peninsula as a substructural part of its relations with the United States. However, South Korea should lead in solving the Korean Peninsula problem and North Korean denuclearization by preemptively suggesting a long-term vision on issues regarding the Korean Peninsula. © 2018 Center for International Studies, Inha University