Secure privacy-preserving record linkage system from re-identification attack

Abstract

Privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) technology, crucial for linking records across datasets while maintaining privacy, is susceptible to graph-based re-identification attacks. These attacks compromise privacy and pose significant risks, such as identity theft and financial fraud. This study proposes a zero-relationship encoding scheme that minimizes the linkage between source and encoded records to enhance PPRL systems’ resistance to re-identification attacks. Our method’s efficacy was validated through simulations on the Titanic and North Carolina Voter Records (NCVR) datasets, demonstrating a substantial reduction in re-identification rates. Security analysis confirms that our zero-relationship encoding effectively preserves privacy against graph-based re-identification threats, improving PPRL technology’s security. © 2025 Lee et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.