Land Reform, Inequality, and Corruption: A Comparative Historical Study of Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines

Abstract

This article explores how inequality increases corruption via electoral clientelism,bureaucratic patronage, and elite capture of policy process through acomparative historical analysis of South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippinesthat shared similar conditions at the time of independence. It finds that successand failure of land reform, which was little affected by corruption butlargely determined by exogenous factors such as external communist threatsand U.S. pressures for reform, produced different levels of inequality, whichin turn influenced subsequent levels of corruption through capture and clientelism. In the Philippines, failed land reform maintained high inequality anddomination of the landed elite in both politics and economy, which led to persistentpolitical clientelism, increasing patronage in bureaucracy, and policycapture by the powerful elite. In contrast, successful land reform in SouthKorea and Taiwan dissolved the landed class and produced egalitariansocioeconomic structure, which helped to maintain state autonomy, containclientelism, promote meritocratic bureaucracy, and develop programmaticpolitics over time.