Industry Competition, Corporate Governance, and Voluntary Disclosure of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Information: Evidence from South Korea

Abstract

This study investigates the relationship between industry competition and managers' voluntary disclosure policies and examined how the corporate governance structure affects this relationship in South Korean companies. The fiercer the competition within the industry to which the company belongs, the higher the incentive for managers to perform strategic actions to improve their competition status. This increase in the strategic incentives of managers can be seen through voluntary disclosure policies. The empirical results of this study are as follows. First, it was found that there was a negative relationship between the degree of industry competition and the level of voluntary disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions information. This means that managers perform less disclosure to maximize the value of the company because the more competition within the industry intensifies, the higher the proprietary cost of disclosing information on greenhouse gas emissions information. Second, it was found that the corporate governance structure weakened the relationship between the degree of industry competition and the level of corporate voluntary disclosure. These results can be interpreted as that a good governance structure supports such managers' disclosure decisions because managers are more likely to choose disclosure policies to maximize the value of the company than personal benefits even in the fierce industry competition.