The Partisan Secret: Institutional Constraints on Policy Change and Partisanship

Abstract

This dissertation examines the theoretical link between institutional setting for policy making and partisanship both in the electorate and the legislature in a consistent framework. I confirm this relationship by analyzing both observational data and experimental data in the three following papers. The first paper, “Partisans in Institutional Context: Institutional Constraints on Policy Change and Mass Partisanship,” examines how political institutions constrain political parties, and thus influence mass partisanship, by connecting behavioral theories on partisanship with gridlock models of political institutions. I theorize that as the institutional constraints on policy change (measured by the number of “veto players” or “gridlock intervals”) increase, the political party in power is less likely to matter in determining policy outcomes, and therefore individuals are less likely to become partisans. I confirm this relationship by analyzing American National Election Studies (ANES) data from 1952 to 2008 and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data that covers 114 election surveys across 49 countries. The second paper, “Change Partisans Can Believe In: Policy Change, Cues, and Partisan Beliefs,” scrutinizes the premise that citizens can infer policy implications from the institutional context, the crucial assumption that underlies my argument in the first paper and a growing literature that connects institutional context and mass behavior. Using a survey experiment, I provide evidence that citizens infer policy implications from the xi institutional context, using “institutional cues” and “elite cues.” Moreover, I demonstrate that this expectation of policy change strengthens their partisan beliefs. The third paper, “The Partisan Secret: Institutional Constraints on Policy Change and Party Unity,” argues that the institutional context shapes the partisan bond among legislators. Viewing party unity as a broad concept that encompasses party members’ decisions to vote together and their decisions to belong together, I theorize that institutional constraints on policy change significantly reduce political parties’ abilities and incentives to foster party unity. Drawing upon novel measures from the Varieties of Democracy (VDem) dataset, I find evidence to support this relationship, based on 129 countries, with time series extending from 1980 to 2000. Taken together, this research enhances our understanding of the institutional underpinnings of partisanship both in the electorate and in the legislature.