경영자 보상과 기업의 투자 및 자본구조정책

Abstract

본 논문은 주가 연계성이 강한 경영자 보상구조를 가진 기업일수록 위험성이 높은 연 구개발 투자 및 유형자산 투자를 중대하고, 반면 부채비율은 상대적으로 낮게 유지한다. 는 실증적 결과를 보고 한다. 이는 경영자 보상 구조가 기업의 투자 및 자본구조정책 등 기업의 재무정책에 유의한 영향을 미치는 있다는 점을 지지하고 있다고 해석된다. 본 연 구가 국내 기존연구와 차별되는 점은 경영자 스목옵션과 보유주식 등 경영자 부의 델타 와 베가를 측정한 후, 이들과 기업의 투자 및 자본구조정책과 연관성을 검토함으로써, 경 영자 보상구조의 영향을 보다 구체적으로 분석하고 있다는 점이다. | 델타는 주가 1% 변동에 대한 옵션과 주식의 가지의 변동으로, 베가는 주가수익률 표준 편차 0.01 변동에 대한 옵션과 주식의 가치의 변동으로 측정하였다. 기업의 투자정책 변 수로는 연구개발비 지출과 유형자산 투자를 사용하며, 자본구조정책 변수로는 총부채비율 을 사용한다. 분석결과에 의하면, 델타와 테가는 다음 년도 연구개발비 지출 및 유형자산 투자와는 양(+)의, 총부채비율과는 음(-)의 관계가 있음을 알 수 있다. 이는 주가 및 주가 변동성에 대한 경영자 부의 민감도가 높을수록 기업은 위험성이 높은 연구개발 투자 및 유형자산 투자를 적극적으로 확대하지만, 레버리지를 낮춤으로써 자본구조를 통한 보증장 치(boning mecharisan)를 이용하려는 유인도 가지게 된다는 것을 보여준다. 이 결과들은 해외 선행연구와 유사하게 한국기업들의 경우에도 스옵션 등 경영자 보상구조가 기업 의 정책에 전반적으로 유의한 영향을 미치고 있다는 가설을 지지하는 것으로 해석된다.

Since Berle and Means (1932) stressed the effect of partial ownership on managerial decision makings, the finance literature has suggested various mechanisms of corporate governance to align managers' selfish incentives with firm value maximization. The managerial compensation scheme has been recognized as one of the most important mechanisms of corporate governance. The most controversial issue in designing a compensation scheme is the sensitivity of managers' wealth to stock price and stock volatility. This paper provides empirical evidence of a strong relation between the structure of managerial compensation and value-critical managerial decisions, such as investment policy and capital structure policy. Specifically, we find that higher prior delta (wealth-to-performance sensitivity) and vega (wealth-to-volatility sensitivity) of managers' wealth are associated with increased investments in research and development, as well as in property, plant, and equipment. But higher prior delta and vega of managers' wealth are associated with lower leverage. This evidence provides a support for the hypothesis that a managerial compensation schemes with higher sensitivity to stock price and volatility increases executives' incentive to invest in riskier projects and, at the same time, to use lower debt levels as a bonding mechanism. Since company-wide option plans have become a substantial component of many firms' equity capital and managerial compensation, a growing body of research on stock options addresses the incentive implications of firm-level option plans (Core and Guay. 2002; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2004). In these studies, the key process in measuring the delta and vega of managers' wealth is related with pricing of executive stock options. We measure the delta of managers' wealth as the sensitivity of their stock and option value with respect to a 1% change in stock price, and the vega as the sensitivity of their option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock return volatility. Using data from the Korean Listed Company Association (KLCA), we compiled all relevant values in estimating the delta and vega of executive stock options such as the total number of options outstanding at the end of the fiscal year, the exercise prices, and remaining times to maturity, We also used KLCA database for managerial share holdings and stock prices. The delta of managers' wealth is defined as the sum of option delta and stock delta. Assuming that the vega of stock is zero, we define the vega of managers' wealth as the option vega. The sample of this research consists of 97 non-financial firms that have endowed stock options as a means of executive compensation since year 2000. The investment policy of a firm is proxied by two variables: the proportion of research and development (R&D) expenditures to total sales, and the capital expenditures in property, plant and equipment (PRE) to total assets. The capital structure policy is proxied by a market value leverage ratio and a book value leverage ratio. We employ both pooled regressions and simultaneous regressions in analyzing the effect of delta and vega on the investment and capital structure decisions. Our empirical analyses show that the delta and vega of managerial wealth are positively related to R&D investments and FPE investments of the firm, and are negatively related to the leverage ratio. The positive relation between the managers' wealth sensitivity and investment implies that managers' wealth sensitivity increases the risk-taking incentive of managers. The negative relation between the managers' wealth sensitivity and leverage ratios implies that managers use the debt level as a bonding mechanism, not as a risk-increasing mechanism. Since the capital structure policy is more easily exposed to external monitoring than the investment policy, managers with higher delta or vega are more prone to choose the investment policy, compared to the capital structure, as a means of increasing risk level of the firm. We could hypothesize that mangers with higher delta and vega as the incentive to increase the risk level of a firm, would invest in riskier projects, and at the same time, maintain a lower debt level of bond themselves to outside investors. Our results are robust to model specifications. Year-by-year regression results are qualitatively the same as those of pooled regression. We also set up a simultaneous equation system to incorporate a possible endogenous relation among wealth sensitivities, investment policy, and capital structure policy, and re-estimate the relation among variables. The simultaneous equation estimators are consistent with the results of pooled or year-by-year regressions. Our empirical findings as a whole support the hypothesis: higher sensitivity to stock price and volatility in the managerial compensation scheme gives executives more incentive to aggressively increase the investment level, and to use a lower debt level as a bonding mechanism. Thus, equity-based compensation such as executive stock options significantly affects value-critical managerial decisions including those of investment policy and capital structure policy.