Detailed Information
Cited 0 time in 
Cited 0 time in 
Cited 0 time in
Metadata Downloads
Signaling games with endogenous types
- Authors
- Cho, In-Koo
- Issue Date
- Mar-2023
- Publisher
- Physica-Verlag Gmbh und Co.
- Keywords
- Signaling games; Endogenous types; Exogenous types; Monotonic signaling games; Single crossing property; Strategic stability; Equilibrium selection
- Citation
- International Journal of Game Theory, v.52, no.1, pp 157 - 174
- Pages
- 18
- Indexed
- SCIE
SSCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- International Journal of Game Theory
- Volume
- 52
- Number
- 1
- Start Page
- 157
- End Page
- 174
- ISSN
- 0020-7276
1432-1270
- Abstract
- This paper examines a signaling game with endogenous types in which the sender can influence the property of his private information. We propose an equilibrium selection criterion, called criterion D3, which builds on criterion D1 from signaling games without endogenous types (Cho and Kreps 1987 and Cho and Sobel 1990). We examine the selected equilibrium properties and compare them to the equilibria selected under the existing selection rules.
- Files in This Item
- Go to Link
- Appears in
Collections - 서울 경제금융대학 > 서울 경제금융학부 > 1. Journal Articles
Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.