CEO networks and the labor market for directorsopen access
- Authors
- Kim, Hyemin; Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger; Low, Angie
- Issue Date
- Jan-2023
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V.
- Keywords
- Board of directors; CEO rolodex; Director labor market; Network connections
- Citation
- Journal of Empirical Finance, v.70, pp.1 - 21
- Indexed
- SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- Journal of Empirical Finance
- Volume
- 70
- Start Page
- 1
- End Page
- 21
- URI
- https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/hanyang/handle/2021.sw.hanyang/191654
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jempfin.2022.11.001
- ISSN
- 0927-5398
- Abstract
- Directors at firms with well-connected CEOs are more likely to obtain directorships at firms that are connected to the CEOs. Recommended directors do not become beholden to the CEO. Reciprocity is an important determinant of recommendations because CEOs are more likely to recommend their directors if they received help from their network filling vacant board positions. CEOs also benefit strategically from the additional appointments of their directors. Analyses of appointment announcement returns and director election results show that shareholders are not concerned by such recommendations. The results highlight the importance of CEOs as intermediaries in the director labor market.
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