Managerial Myopia, Financial Expertise, and Executive-Firm Matching
- Authors
- Anjos, Fernando; Kang, Chang Mo
- Issue Date
- Feb-2017
- Publisher
- ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
- Keywords
- Managerial myopiaCateringFinancial expertiseExecutive-firm matching
- Citation
- JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, v.43, pp.464 - 479
- Indexed
- SSCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE
- Volume
- 43
- Start Page
- 464
- End Page
- 479
- URI
- https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/hanyang/handle/2021.sw.hanyang/20561
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.02.010
- ISSN
- 0929-1199
- Abstract
- Existing literature emphasizes skills-based explanations for executive-firm matching, namely in the context of financial expertise. In contrast, our paper argues that informational concerns may also be relevant. We model a public firm with a project opportunity of uncertain quality, where long-run shareholders choose between hiring an operational manager or a financial expert. These managers are equally myopic, however financial experts are also privy to stock-market beliefs. Financial experts invest sub-optimally due to catering incentives, while operational managers tend to engage in signaling-driven overinvestment. We show that operational managers are preferred for low-NPV projects or when stock markets are well informed.
- Files in This Item
-
Go to Link
- Appears in
Collections - 서울 경영대학 > 서울 파이낸스경영학과 > 1. Journal Articles
![qrcode](https://api.qrserver.com/v1/create-qr-code/?size=55x55&data=https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/hanyang/handle/2021.sw.hanyang/20561)
Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.