Entry Deterrence and Price Competition under Asymmetric Information비대칭적 정보 하에서 진입 억제와 가격 경쟁
- Other Titles
- 비대칭적 정보 하에서 진입 억제와 가격 경쟁
- Authors
- Maeng, Jooyol; Choi, Sungyong
- Issue Date
- Dec-2016
- Publisher
- 한국경영과학회
- Keywords
- Price-Based Duopoly Market; Limit Pricing; Asymmetric Information; Signaling Game(Production and Operations Management)
- Citation
- 경영과학, v.33, no.4, pp.65 - 75
- Indexed
- KCI
- Journal Title
- 경영과학
- Volume
- 33
- Number
- 4
- Start Page
- 65
- End Page
- 75
- URI
- https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/hanyang/handle/2021.sw.hanyang/4858
- DOI
- 10.7737/KMSR.2016.33.4.065
- ISSN
- 1225-1100
- Abstract
- We study limit pricing in a price-based duopoly market under asymmetric information on the demand state. An incumbent, who is a monopolist in the initial period, has complete information on the size of a market, while a potential entrant only knows it partially. After observing the sales price of the incumbent in the first period, the entrant decides whether to enter a duopoly market and the sales price if she chooses to. We present a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which indicates that limit pricing can deter the entry of a potential entrant under price competition when there is information asymmetry about the demand state.
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