The Logical Form of Ascriptions of Intention-in-action

Abstract

The concept of intention-in-action plays an important yet contentious role in contemporary philosophy of action. One source of contention concerns the structure and content of intentions-in-action. While all intentions are directed toward future goals, toward actions that an agent seeks to perform in the future, only intentions-in-action relate those future goals to what the agent is doing in the present. Exactly how intentions-in-action relate future goals to present actions is a matter of some dispute; the aim of this paper is to try to resolve that dispute by clarifying the logical form of ascriptions of intention-in-action. While I agree with George Wilson and Carl Ginet that a correct understanding of the function of intentions-in-action undermines the standard arguments in support of the causal theory of action, I deny-what they assert-that intentions-in-action are de re with respect to the actions they serve to explain.