The impact of political capabilities and political markets on firms' decision to lobby
- Authors
- Choi, Seong-jin; Jimenez, Alfredo; Lee, Jeoung Yul
- Issue Date
- Dec-2020
- Publisher
- ELSEVIER
- Keywords
- Political capabilities; Political structure; Lobbying; Corporate political activity; Multinational strategy
- Citation
- JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT, v.26, no.4, pp.1 - 16
- Indexed
- SSCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT
- Volume
- 26
- Number
- 4
- Start Page
- 1
- End Page
- 16
- URI
- https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/hanyang/handle/2021.sw.hanyang/8167
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.intman.2020.100796
- ISSN
- 1075-4253
- Abstract
- This paper investigates how firms' political capabilities and countries' political structures affect firms' lobbying decision. We use a cross-country, firm-level dataset that covers more than 22,013 firms in 46 countries to discover that a firm's individual- and collective-level political capabilities are positively associated with lobbying. In contrast, the degree of checks and balances among bureaucrats in a country's political market is negatively associated with the firm's possibility of lobbying. Finally, we also find that the positive role of a firm's political capabilities in lobbying is mitigated by the degree of checks and balances among bureaucrats. This study contributes to the literature of corporate political activities by filling the research gaps (1) as considering both horizontal and vertical checks and balances among bureaucrats in political markets, and (2) as simultaneously considering firms' individual and collective political capabilities, by taking one more conceptual step on the literature of contingent dynamic capabilities and lobbying.
- Files in This Item
-
Go to Link
- Appears in
Collections - 서울 경영대학 > 서울 경영학부 > 1. Journal Articles
Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.