Generating unit maintenance scheduling under competitive market environments

Abstract

A novel approach to a generating unit maintenance scheduling problem in competitive electricity markets is presented in this paper. The objective is to develop a game-theoretic framework for analyzing strategic behaviors of generating companies (Gencos) from the standpoint of the generating unit maintenance scheduling (GMS) game and for obtaining the equilibrium solution for the GMS game. The GMS problem is formulated as a dynamic non-cooperative game with complete information. The players correspond to profit maximizing individual Gencos, and the payoff of each player is defined as the profits from the energy market. The optimal schedule is defined by Nash equilibrium (equilibriums) of the game. Numerical results for two-Genco system are used to demonstrate that the proposed framework can be successfully applied to analyzing the strategic behaviors of each Genco and to obtaining the corresponding Nash equilibrium. The result indicates that generating unit maintenance schedule is one of the major strategic behaviors whereby Gencos maximize their profits in a competitive market environment. (C) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.