Evolution of the U.S.–ROK Alliance, 1953–1978: A Historical Institutionalist Perspective

Abstract

What accounts for the pace, timing, and scope of the U.S.–ROK alliance’s evolution? Through the prism of historical institutionalism, I construct a novel explanation for how the alliance, in particular its rule on operational control, has been subject to the confluence of internally generated dynamics, exogenous junctures, and historical processes. First, I illustrate how three crises—a coup in 1961, ROK forces deployment to Vietnam in 1965, and North Korea’s provocations in 1968—were instrumental in exposing flaws and gaps, unanticipated in the original alliance design. Second, episodic analysis shows how each juncture temporarily loosened the structural constraints and allowed ROK to push for incremental revisions on U.S. vertical and unilateral exercise of operational control over ROK forces. Third, they collectively generated negative feedback, contributing to the establishment of more horizontal and institutionalized Combined Forces Command in 1978. The study highlights a client ally’s agency and historical institutionalism’s promise in understanding international security institutions. © 2022 Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.