The Truth-Conduciveness Problem of Coherentism and a Sellarsian Explanatory Coherence Theory
- Authors
- Lee, BD[Lee, Byeong D.]
- Issue Date
- 2017
- Publisher
- ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
- Citation
- INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, v.25, no.1, pp.63 - 79
- Indexed
- AHCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
- Volume
- 25
- Number
- 1
- Start Page
- 63
- End Page
- 79
- URI
- https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/skku/handle/2021.sw.skku/33789
- DOI
- 10.1080/09672559.2016.1236140
- ISSN
- 0967-2559
- Abstract
- According to the truth-conduciveness problem of coherentism, the coherence theory of justification can hardly show that coherentist justification is truth-conducive. This problem is generally conceived as the most recalcitrant problem with the coherence theory. The purpose of this paper is to show that it does not pose a serious problem for a certain version of coherentism, namely a Sellarsian explanatory coherence theory of justification combined with the deflationary theory of truth. On this version of coherentism, our epistemic goal is to gradually improve our conceptual framework so as to maximize its explanatory coherence, and there is no substantial norm of truth independent of the norms of justification, so that we cannot evaluate the truth-conduciveness of a belief independently of the norms of justification. I argue that this version of coherentism can cope with the truth-conduciveness problem.
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Collections - Liberal Arts > Department of Philosophy > 1. Journal Articles
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