Epistemic Principles and Epistemic Circularity
- Authors
- Lee, BD[Lee, Byeong D.]
- Issue Date
- Jun-2014
- Keywords
- Crispin Wright; Epistemic circularity; Epistemic first principle; Epistemic presumption; Instrumental reasoning; Wilfrid Sellars
- Citation
- PHILOSOPHIA, v.42, no.2, pp.413 - 432
- Indexed
- AHCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- PHILOSOPHIA
- Volume
- 42
- Number
- 2
- Start Page
- 413
- End Page
- 432
- URI
- https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/skku/handle/2021.sw.skku/52838
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11406-013-9495-5
- ISSN
- 0048-3893
- Abstract
- Can we show that our senses are reliable sources of information about the world? To show this, we need to establish that most of our perceptual judgments have been true. But we cannot determine these inductive instances without relying upon sense perception. Thus, it seems, we cannot establish the reliability of sense perception by means of an argument without falling into epistemic circularity. In this paper, I argue that this consequence is not an epistemological disaster. For this purpose, I defend a normative claim that it is reasonable to accept the general reliability of our perceptual judgments, instead of a factual claim that our perceptual judgments are generally reliable. More specifically, I offer a normative practical argument which explains why it is reasonable to accept the general reliability of our perceptual judgments, even though we cannot establish the general reliability of our perceptual judgments by means of theoretical reasoning.
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Collections - Liberal Arts > Department of Philosophy > 1. Journal Articles
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