Fales's Defense of the Given and Requirements for Being a Reason
- Authors
- Lee, BD[Lee, Byeong D.]
- Issue Date
- Dec-2013
- Publisher
- SPRINGER
- Keywords
- The Sellarsian dilemma; Fales; Direct apprehension; An expansive conception of inference; Requirements for being a reason
- Citation
- PHILOSOPHIA, v.41, no.4, pp.1217 - 1235
- Indexed
- AHCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- PHILOSOPHIA
- Volume
- 41
- Number
- 4
- Start Page
- 1217
- End Page
- 1235
- URI
- https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/skku/handle/2021.sw.skku/58470
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11406-013-9425-6
- ISSN
- 0048-3893
- Abstract
- Fales defends the doctrine of the given against the Sellarsian dilemma. On his view, sensory experiences, to which one has direct access, can justify basic beliefs. He upholds this view by way of defending an expansive conception of inference, according to which a broadly inferential relation can hold between sensory experiences and perceptual beliefs. The purpose of this paper is to show that Fales's defense of the given fails. For this purpose, I argue that there are two requirements for being a good reason, and that his conception of direct apprehension faces a serious dilemma with regard to these requirements. In addition, I argue that his expansive conception of inference is unfounded.
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Collections - Liberal Arts > Department of Philosophy > 1. Journal Articles
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