레비나스의 훗설 현상학 이해: 수용과 비판

Abstract

In the early age Levinas received the concept of Husserl’s intentionality, which constitutes the meaning of the world given in the consciousness, denouncing the naive knowledge of the world. Levinas presents two principal critiques on phenomenology: one is the critique of Husserl’s intellectualism, the other is that the epoché can not prove the existence of the other person in the transcendental sphere. Levinas, receiving Heidegger’s concept of intentionality against that of Husserl, affirms that intentionality is no more than consciousness of the something, but an exit from oneself or the relationship with alterity. Levinas points out that Husserl’s transcendence is the one toward the self, having no place for the exteriority. Levinas, denouncing the Western philosophical tradition as egological, affirms the otherness of the other persons. Levinas, critiquing the idealist tradition from Hegel to Husserl to conceive the identity of thinking as the one of being, points out that the other is total different from the object of egological reflection. Levinas emphasizes the transcendence and infinity in the deep understanding of the intentionality, understands the consciousness as overflowing. In contrast to the totality thinking, which absorbs all things into the self, Levinas suggests the concept of the infinite. which, avoiding the totalization, is able to signify the transcendence or the Other. The idea of infinite is in Husserl’s meaning never fulfilled, in this sense, it is desire and homesickness. Levinas, denying the monadian subjectivity model of Husserl, affirms the intentionality is not the last ground of all knowledges, but only receiving the knowledges as tasks. He suggests the anti-monadian subjectivity model which does not absorb the world into itself, but approves its independence from the subjectivity. Levinas suggests the idea of infinite which is the radical other and protests the self in the transcendence. The other appears as a face in the nakedness. The face of the Other is a meaning without the horizon prior to the transcendental meaning-giving. In terms of the description of the face of Other, Levinas breaks up the intentional description of the noesis-noema structure affirming that the correspondence-relationship of intentionality does not function in the representation of the infinite. Through the idea of infinite, according to Levinas, the phenomenological intentionality has to be opened toward the thinking of true transcendence. The object of the true transcendence is the Other, the transcendence toward the Other requests the ethical thinking to listen to the appeal of the Other.