The Economy, Corruption, and Conditional Voting: A Cross-National Analysis

Abstract

The state of the economy and the extent of corruption have been considered two significant factors predicting the success of incumbent parties in elections. However, the effects of economic growth and the perceived level of government corruption on an incumbent party’s electoral fortunes vary across countries. Why do the strengths of economic voting or corruption voting vary and under what conditions does their influence become weaker or stronger? This paper attempts to answer these questions using the following rationale: the economy may become a less salient election issue in affluent societies, or other competing issues such as corruption may become more salient. Similarly, corruption may become less salient in trustworthy societies, or other competing issues such as the economy may become more salient. Based on this logic, this paper hypothesizes that economic voting becomes weaker as a country’s national wealth increases (based on GDP per capita) and as voters’ perceived level of government corruption increases. Moreover, corruption voting becomes weaker in countries where government is perceived to be highly accountable and when there is great progress or severe downturns in economic growth. By examining 92 elections from 41 democracies between 1996 and 2011, this paper finds empirical evidence supporting the hypotheses. The strength of the relationship between economic growth and an incumbent party’s vote share decreases as GDP per capita or perceived level of government corruption increases, whereas the extent to which perceived government corruption influences incumbent party vote share decreases as the absolute level of government corruption increases or GDP per capita severely changes.