CEO pension and selling, general and administrative cost stickinessopen access
- Authors
- Mo, Kyoungwon; Park, Kyung Jin; Kim, YoungJin
- Issue Date
- Dec-2018
- Publisher
- Allied Business Academies
- Keywords
- Agency problem; CEO Pension; Cost stickiness; Inside Debt
- Citation
- International Journal of Entrepreneurship, v.22, no.4
- Journal Title
- International Journal of Entrepreneurship
- Volume
- 22
- Number
- 4
- URI
- https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/cau/handle/2019.sw.cau/18947
- ISSN
- 1099-9264
- Abstract
- Using CEO pension as inside debt, we show how inside debt affects cost stickiness. Inside debt was recently recognized as debt-based compensation that increases managers’ risk aversion. More risk adverse managers will reduce cost stickiness if it suits their self-interest. We empirically find that inside debt decreases cost stickiness, which implies that cost stickiness is mainly driven by overconfident CEOs’ intentions to benefit them. Our results show that inside debt can mitigate the agency problem in cost stickiness.
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- Appears in
Collections - College of Business & Economics > School of Business Administration > 1. Journal Articles
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