사법적(司法的) 결정의 정치적 작용 : 헌법재판소의 정당 관련 결정에 대한 비판적 재검토

Abstract

정당 분야에서 우리 헌법재판소의 사법적 결정은 정당정치의 건전한 발전에 바람직한 정치적 촉매작용을 하고 있는가? 이 글에서는 ① 정당에 대한 차별적 우대, ② 의원에 대한 정당규율의 강화, ③ 신생정당․군소정당의 배제, ④ 정당가입 자유의 과도한 보장 등 네 측면에서 헌법재판소 결정의 정치적 정합성을 분석했다. 결론적으로 ① 헌법재판소의 정당 관련 결정들은 우리 정당정치의 건전한 발전에 잘못된 신호를 보내고 있으며, ② 대통령제 정부형태 및 소선거구 다수대표제 선거제도와 조화되기 어려운, 의원내각제 정부형태 및 완전 비례대표제 선거제도에서의 정치적 논리를 차용하고 있는데, ③ 이는 선진 제국의 법제․판례의 일반적 경향으로부터도 벗어난 것으로 판단되었다.

The Constitutional Court of Korea, under the influence of the German “Parteienstaat(party state)” theory, has widely accepted the constitutional privileges of political parties, even more widely than the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. Moreover, the Constitutional Court of Korea has strongly upheld strict party discipline, even more strongly than the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. However, such “pro-party” tendencies of the Constitutional Court cannot be consistent with our presidential system, which requires weak and undisciplined parties. They don’t match with our plurality election system, either. In 2004Hun-Ma246 decision, the Constitutional Court of Korea accepted the high standard of party registration as constitutional, holding that it can promote political stability in our parliamentary democracy. In 2004Hun-Ma655 decision, the Constitutional Court also accepted the discriminative standard of public financing to parties as constitutional on similar grounds. With the two decisions, the Constitutional Court discouraged new and minor parties, as well as regional parties, and thus substantially reduced political competition. In both cases, the Constitutional Court of Korea went far beyond the Supreme Court of Canada in its Figueroa v. Canada case and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in its party finance cases. In 97Hun-Ma262 and 99Hun-Ma135 decisions, the Constitutional Court gave high priority to the constitutional right to participate in political parties. Together with the existing strong party discipline, however, it may cause dangerous situations in our “yet young” presidential system. In conclusion, I maintain that the Constitutional Court should send new judicial signals to “soften and smoothen” the current “strong and stubborn” party politics.