경영자 스톡옵션 보상이 회계보수성에 미치는 영향

Abstract

본 연구의 목적은 경영자 스톡옵션 보상이 회계보수성에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지를 파악하는데 있다. 회계보수성을 측정하기 위한 변수로는 비영업발생액, C_score, 수익비용 인식시점의 차이를 대용변수로 사용하였으며, 이러한 다양한 회계보수성 지표가 경영자 스톡옵션 보상과 어떠한 관련성을 가지는지를 확인하고자 하였다. 또한 두 변수의 관련성이 지배주주와 외국인주주 지분율이 높은 기업과 낮은 기업간에 차이가 발생하는 지에 대해서도 분석하였다. 실증분석을 위한 표본은 2000년부터 2007년까지 한국거래소에 상장된 130개의 비금융기업의 627개 기업-연도 기업을 분석 자료로 사용하였다. 분석결과, 첫째 회계보수성 대용변수로 사용한 비영업발생액과 C_score 및 수익비용 인식시점의 차이 모두에서 경영자의 스톡옵션 보상이 높은 기업일수록 회계보수성 수준이 증가하였다. 둘째, 회계보수성 대용변수로 비영업발생액과 C_score를 사용한 경우, 지배주주 지분율이 높은 기업에서 보수회계 선택에 대한 경영자 스톡옵션 보상의 효과가 낮았다. 그러나 수익비용 인식시점의 차이를 사용한 경우에는 오히려, 지배주주 지분율이 낮은 기업에서 스톡옵션 보상의 효과가 크게 나타났다. 셋째, 경영자 스톡옵션 보상이 회계보수성에 미치는 영향은 회계보수성 지표에 관계없이 외국인주주 지분율이 낮은 기업보다 높은 기업에서 일관되게 크게 나타났다.

This study is to test the relationship between accounting conservatism and stock option compensation for managers. It also tests that the relationship between stock option compensation and conservative accounting is changed by the percentage of a firm s shares held by controlling shareholders and foreign investors. It is expected that stock option compensation will have a positive relationship with conservatism as it induces managers to select conservative accounting. It is also expected that the relationship between stock option compensation and conservatism will become lower as shares of controlling shareholder being high because controlling shareholders prefer to less conservative accounting. However the relationship between stock option compensation and conservatism will become higher as shares of foreign shareholder being high because foreign shareholders require more conservative accounting. This study uses three alternative measures of accounting conservatism: nonoperating accruals, C_score used by Penman and Zhang(2002), and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. The sample consists of 130 firms (627 firm-year observations) listed on Korean Stock Exchange from the year of 2000 to 2007. The results of this study can be summarized as follows: First, in results of regression using nonoperating accruals, C_score and a measure of asymmetric timeliness of earnings as conservatism measures the coefficient on stock option compensation to a measure of conservatism is positive and statistically significant as expected. Second, the relationship between stock option compensation and conservatism is more negative and statistically significant for a group of firms with controlling shareholders shares being high than firms with their shares being low. But the relationship between two variables is not always consistent when it uses a measure of asymmetric timeliness of earnings as a measure of accounting conservatism. Finally, the coefficient on stock option compensation to a measure of conservatism becomes higher and statistically significant for firms with foreign investors shares being high than firms with their shares being low. The results are always same regardless of proxies for accounting conservatism. Findings of this study have the following practical implications. The relationship between stock option compensation and conservative accounting varies across conservatism measures, which implies having a prudent consideration for selecting proxies as a measure of accounting conservatism. The effect of manager s stock option on conservatism is different by the percentage of shares held by controlling and foreign shareholders. This shows that shareholders may consider stock option as an incentive to increase accounting transparency and accounting conservatism.