Audience Costs, Information, and Credible Commitment Problems
- Authors
- Moon, Chungshik; Souva, Mark
- Issue Date
- Apr-2016
- Publisher
- SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC
- Keywords
- audience costs; credible commitments; crisis bargaining; information
- Citation
- JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, v.60, no.3, pp 434 - 458
- Pages
- 25
- Journal Title
- JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
- Volume
- 60
- Number
- 3
- Start Page
- 434
- End Page
- 458
- URI
- https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/cau/handle/2019.sw.cau/37083
- DOI
- 10.1177/0022002714545222
- ISSN
- 0022-0027
1552-8766
- Abstract
- Leaders who can accumulate audience costs can send costly signals that may help alleviate information problems associated with crisis escalation. We argue that research examining the effect of audience costs fails to appreciate the theoretical context in which audience costs matter. Audience costs may help alleviate information problems associated with international conflict. However, credible commitment problems are more central than information problems for some international conflicts. Theory does not expect audience costs to matter in this context; as a result, extant tests, and many criticisms, of the effect of audience costs on crisis escalation are flawed. We offer a more appropriate test of the effect of audience costs on crisis escalation. Consistent with extant theoretical arguments, we find that audience costs only reduce the likelihood of conflict when credible commitment problems are not the dominant concern motivating a dispute or crisis.
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Collections - College of Social Sciences > Department of Political Science and International Relations > 1. Journal Articles
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