The equivalence of rent-seeking outcomes for competitive-share and strategic groups
- Authors
- Baik, Kyung Hwan; Dijkstra, Bouwe R; Lee, Sanghack; Lee, Shi Young
- Issue Date
- Jun-2006
- Keywords
- Competitive-share group; Equivalence in rent seeking; Rent-seeking contest; Strategic group
- Citation
- European Journal of Political Economy, v.22, no.2, pp 337 - 342
- Pages
- 6
- Journal Title
- European Journal of Political Economy
- Volume
- 22
- Number
- 2
- Start Page
- 337
- End Page
- 342
- URI
- https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/cau/handle/2019.sw.cau/52908
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.10.004
- ISSN
- 0176-2680
- Abstract
- In competitive-share groups, groups of players compete for a rent and members of the winning group share the prize according to a weighted average of relative outlay and egalitarian shares. In strategic groups, group members compete individually for a rent and the winner keeps a part of the rent, and divides the rest among group members. In this note, we show that these two portrayals of rent seeking with groups are equivalent. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Collections - College of Business & Economics > School of Business Administration > 1. Journal Articles
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