Known Plaintext Attacks on the Omar and abed Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
- Authors
- Choi, S.; Lee, H.T.
- Issue Date
- Oct-2022
- Publisher
- IEEE Computer Society
- Keywords
- Homomorphic encryption; known plaintext attacks; noise-free; security analysis; symmetric key encryption
- Citation
- International Conference on ICT Convergence, v.2022-October, pp 1154 - 1157
- Pages
- 4
- Journal Title
- International Conference on ICT Convergence
- Volume
- 2022-October
- Start Page
- 1154
- End Page
- 1157
- URI
- https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/cau/handle/2019.sw.cau/61182
- DOI
- 10.1109/ICTC55196.2022.9952419
- ISSN
- 2162-1233
- Abstract
- In 2020, Omar and abed proposed a new noise-free fully homomorphic encryption scheme that allows arbitrary computations on encrypted data without decryption. However, they did not provide a sufficient security analysis of the proposed scheme and just stated that it is secure under the integer factorization assumption. In this paper, we present known plaintext attacks on their scheme and illustrate them with toy examples. Our attack algorithms are quite simple: They require several times of greatest common divisor (GCD) computations using only a few pair of message and ciphertext.
- Files in This Item
- There are no files associated with this item.
- Appears in
Collections - College of Software > School of Computer Science and Engineering > 1. Journal Articles
![qrcode](https://api.qrserver.com/v1/create-qr-code/?size=55x55&data=https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/cau/handle/2019.sw.cau/61182)
Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.