Electronic voting and strategic disclosure before shareholder meetings
- Authors
- Lee, Eugenia Yujin; Ha, Wonsuk
- Issue Date
- Oct-2022
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V.
- Keywords
- Corporate governance; Electronic voting; Information technology; Shareholder meeting; Voluntary disclosure
- Citation
- Economics Letters, v.219
- Journal Title
- Economics Letters
- Volume
- 219
- URI
- https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/cau/handle/2019.sw.cau/61200
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110839
- ISSN
- 0165-1765
1873-7374
- Abstract
- Electronic voting allows shareholders to participate in shareholder meetings without being physically present. This study examines the effect of electronic voting on firms’ disclosure behavior before the meetings. Empirical analyses reveal that firms that adopt electronic voting are more likely than non-adopting firms to provide good-news earnings forecasts before shareholder meetings. Firms with poorer past performance are more likely to increase disclosure. The positive returns associated with disclosure in the pre-meeting period reverse after the meeting. Overall, the results suggest that electronic voting induces strategic disclosure by managers, significantly altering the corporate information environment. © 2022 Elsevier B.V.
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