Performance Analysis of Direct GNSS Spoofing Detection with Accelerometers for Constant Velocity

Abstract

Global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) are gaining importance as their main applications in localization and navigation particularly for future autonomous vehicle navigation. A drawback of GNSS for spoofing is the simple structure of the GNSS signal and its weak strength on the Earth’s surface. These conditions can expose civilian users to GNSS spoofing attacks with the potential to cause significant damage. There are many approaches to detecting GNSS spoofing; one category uses independent sensors, such as inertial sensors. Inertial sensors are typically used as tightly coupled GNSS/INS (inertial navigation system) integration to provide consistency checks for position, velocity, or other parameters. However, in this study, a direct consistency check of the acceleration itself is used to detect spoofing and provide the probability density function (PDF) of a proposed decision variable for a constant-velocity case. The proposed decision variable compares the accelerations of the GNSS and accelerometers for the constant-velocity case. The performance of the proposed spoofing detection method is analyzed based on the detection probability of GNSS spoofing.