경제자유지수와 지니계수와의 관계 실증분석

Abstract

본 연구는 SWIID 자료와 경제자유지수 자료를 활용하여 경제자유지수가 지니계수에 미치는 영향을 추정하였다. 추정방법으로는 두 변수 사이의 내생성을 고려하기 위하여 도구변수추정 모형을 적용하였다. 추정 결과 경제자유지수를 구성하는 세부 분야 중 정부규모가 커지거나 또는 재산권보호가 잘 될수록 지니계수가 통계적으로 유의하게 감소하는 것으로 나타났다. 이와 같은 결과는 소득불평등을 완화시키기 위해서는 복지지출 확대 등 정부의 규모를 증가 시키는 방법 이외에도 정부가 직접 개입하는 대신 시장의 질서를 확고하게 유지해주는 역할을 올바르게 수행하는 방안도 효과적일 수 있음을 시사한다. 한편 내생성을 고려한 도구변수 추정 결과에 따르면 시장규제완화가 소득불평등을 심화시킬 수 있다는 주장은 실증적으로 뒷받침되지 못했다.

We estimate the effect of the Economic Freedom of the World index on the Gini coefficient using the SWIID and the Economic Freedom of the World data. There are several channels that link economic freedom to the degree of income inequality in an economy. For example, restricting economic freedom by a redistributive policy or market regulation can reduce income inequality. Protectionism in international trade may also raise the living standard of the poor in the developed countries. However, limited economic freedom may also lead to deteriorating the problem of inequality. An inefficient welfare policy can offer to the poor an undesirable option of low income and less work. Labor market regulation may reduce the number of jobs available for the poor. Trade barriers can also decrease unskilled jobs in the developing countries. Ordinary least square regressions do not clearly show the causal relationship between economic freedom and inequality because of the endogeneity problem. An instrumental variable method is used to consider the endogeneity between the Economic Freedom of the World index and the Gini coefficient. Different from Bergh and Nilsson (2010) that used panel GMM estimation, we use two-stage least square estimation using five different instrumental variables. Our five instrumental variables were tailored to the sub-categories of the Economic Freedom of the World index. Specifically, we have chosen the social trust index for the size of the government, the European settlement rate in the colonies in 1900 for the security of property rights, the colonial settlers’ mortality rate in 1900 for the access to sound money, the political instability index for freedom to trade internationally, and military conscription for the regulation of credit, labor, and business. The result shows that the Gini coefficient significantly diminished as the size of government increases or the property rights are well protected. This implies that protecting property rights without the extended intervention of government into the market could be as effective as the welfare expenditure of large government for alleviating income inequality. Our result fails to support that the relaxation of market regulations polarizes income distribution.