敬과 窮理의 메커니즘 - 정이의 수양공부론은 認知的인가? -

Abstract

This paper aims to examine the theory of self-cultivation which is a work of ChengYi[程頤] who is regarded as a progenitor of Cheng-zhu’s Lixue[理學] in the Neo-Confuciansim during the Song-Ming periods and figure out its meaning. According to researches done until now, there are two predominant view on his theory of self-cultivation. The first idea is to understand his theory of self-cultivation as a perceptive study based on intellectual capacity and it is the generally accepted view on how to grasp his philosophy. The other interpretation is based on ontic cultivation[本體工夫] which is argued by researchers who underline ‘moral autonomy’ of Cheng-zhu’s Lixue. I refuse both interpretations because of the two following reasons. ChengYi’s theory of self-cultivation can not be considered as ‘ontic cultivation’ which is claimed by LuWangXue[陸王學] even if it includes development[涵養] and moral knowledge[德性之知]. Moreover, it is not merely a recognitive study despite of emphasis on the intellectual capacity of theoretical reason. On the ground of Xin[心], ChengYi’s theory of self-cultivation claims that human being should be aware of moral law and behave accordingly. Therefore ChengYi’s theory of self-cultivation can be accounted a meaningful theory of practicing morality.

This paper aims to examine the theory of self-cultivation which is a work of ChengYi[程頤] who is regarded as a progenitor of Cheng-zhu’s Lixue[理學] in the Neo-Confuciansim during the Song-Ming periods and figure out its meaning. According to researches done until now, there are two predominant view on his theory of self-cultivation. The first idea is to understand his theory of self-cultivation as a perceptive study based on intellectual capacity and it is the generally accepted view on how to grasp his philosophy. The other interpretation is based on ontic cultivation[本體工夫] which is argued by researchers who underline ‘moral autonomy’ of Cheng-zhu’s Lixue. I refuse both interpretations because of the two following reasons. ChengYi’s theory of self-cultivation can not be considered as ‘ontic cultivation’ which is claimed by LuWangXue[陸王學] even if it includes development[涵養] and moral knowledge[德性之知]. Moreover, it is not merely a recognitive study despite of emphasis on the intellectual capacity of theoretical reason. On the ground of Xin[心], ChengYi’s theory of self-cultivation claims that human being should be aware of moral law and behave accordingly. Therefore ChengYi’s theory of self-cultivation can be accounted a meaningful theory of practicing morality.