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Supervisory information and loss aversion
- Authors
- Shin, Dong Soo; Yun, Sungho
- Issue Date
- Jul-2021
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Keywords
- Corruption; Loss aversion; Supervisory information
- Citation
- Economics Letters, v.204, pp 1 - 4
- Pages
- 4
- Indexed
- SSCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- Economics Letters
- Volume
- 204
- Start Page
- 1
- End Page
- 4
- ISSN
- 0165-1765
1873-7374
- Abstract
- This study examines the optimality of allowing corrupt interactions (bribery, framing and extortion) between the supervisor and the agent when the agent is loss averse. We show that although inducing bribery leads to effective usage of the supervisory information, preventing all corrupt interactions between the supervisor and the agent by disregarding some of supervisory information can be optimal. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Related Researcher
- yun, sung ho
- COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS (DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS)