Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Khalil, Fahad | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lawarree, Jacques | - |
dc.contributor.author | Yun, Sungho | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-06-23T14:39:03Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-06-23T14:39:03Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2021-01-21 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010-01 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0741-6261 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://scholarworks.bwise.kr/erica/handle/2021.sw.erica/40577 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Both bribery and extortion weaken the power of incentives, but there is a trade-off in fighting the two because rewards to prevent supervisors from accepting bribes create incentives for extortion. Which is the worse evil? A fear of inducing extortion may make it optimal to tolerate bribery, but extortion is never allowed. Extortion discourages "good behavior" because the agent suffers from it even though he has done the right thing, whereas a bribe acts as a penalty for "bad behavior." Our analysis provides lessons to fight corruption and explanations why developed countries may have an advantage in dealing with extortion. | - |
dc.language | 영어 | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | WILEY | - |
dc.title | Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Yun, Sungho | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00095.x | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-74949139879 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 000273823200008 | - |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, v.41, no.1, pp.179 - 198 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | - |
dc.citation.title | RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | - |
dc.citation.volume | 41 | - |
dc.citation.number | 1 | - |
dc.citation.startPage | 179 | - |
dc.citation.endPage | 198 | - |
dc.type.rims | ART | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | ssci | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | ahci | - |
dc.description.journalRegisteredClass | scopus | - |
dc.relation.journalResearchArea | Business & Economics | - |
dc.relation.journalWebOfScienceCategory | Economics | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | COLLUSION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | CORRUPTION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | RENEGOTIATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | DELEGATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | DESIGN | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | DESIGN | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | LAW | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | SOFT INFORMATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | DELEGATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | HIERARCHIES | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | COLLUSION | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | CORRUPTION | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | ENFORCEMENT | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | RENEGOTIATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | AGENT RELATIONSHIP | - |
dc.identifier.url | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00095.x | - |
Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
55 Hanyangdeahak-ro, Sangnok-gu, Ansan, Gyeonggi-do, 15588, Korea+82-31-400-4269 sweetbrain@hanyang.ac.kr
COPYRIGHT © 2021 HANYANG UNIVERSITY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
Certain data included herein are derived from the © Web of Science of Clarivate Analytics. All rights reserved.
You may not copy or re-distribute this material in whole or in part without the prior written consent of Clarivate Analytics.